Difference of Opinion regarding Mandatory Attorney Fee Dispute Arbitration

The Fee Dispute Resolution Program (22 NYCRR §137) was created to mandate arbitration of fee disputes between attorneys and their former clients in civil matters. It has been subject to differing opinions among different departments leading to divergent opinions on the issue of whether or not an arbitration is necessary when the former client fails to object the validity of the underlying fee.

In 2000, the Second Department determined in Scordio that when there is a fee dispute between an attorney and a former client, the attorney was not required to send notice to the former client informing them of their rights to arbitrate when there was no dispute or objection to the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees. Scordio v. Scordio, 270 A.D.2d 328 (2nd Dept. 2000).

The decision in Scordio would ordinarily lend to the notion that an attorney may pursue collection of his fees without notice to a client of his right to arbitration but the rules regarding arbitration of fee disputes were modified and expanded in 2002, and now lists exceptions to when a notice to a client of his right to arbitrate can be waived. In Wexler & Burkhart, the court held that a reading of the Rules in this way would “effectively eviscerate Part 137 of the Rules, a comprehensive scheme for the informal and expeditious resolution of fee disputes between attorneys and clients through arbitration and mediation.” Wexler & Burkart LLP v. Grant, 12 Misc.3d 1162(A) (Nassau Cty. 2006).

The court in Rotker determined that “the rules of the appellate division establish a clear public policy in favor of the arbitration of attorney-client fee disputes.” Rotker v. Rotker, 195 Misc.2d 768 (Westchester Cty. 2003). Rotker was a matrimonial case where the attorneys for the wife instituted a retainer lien against her for non-payment of her fees. The attorneys asserted that since the client had not disputed the fees, under Scordio, they were entitled to payment without arbitration. The court held that even if it was determined that counsel was not fired for cause, the attorneys were required to provide the client notice of her rights to arbitrate the dispute, with said notice given in writing. If the client then failed to avail herself of her right to arbitrate after 30 days of mailing the notice, the right to arbitration would be waived. Id at 790-791.

The court in Rotker went so far as to hold that the failure of former counsel to send the 30-day notice, regardless of whether or not there is a dispute, would mandate the dismissal of any action for unpaid counsel fees. Rotker at 791.

The basic tenet held in these decisions is the idea that if the Scordio argument is used as a means to avoid Rule 137, then nearly anyone can circumvent the protections that Rule 137 was meant to provide. Wexler & Burkhart LLP at 214;

The position of the Wexler & Burkhart decision and the Rotker decision was most recently supported in Noel F. Caraccio, where the court held that regardless of whether there was an objection or dispute as to the fees when they were billed, the attorney was still required to send the 30-day notice of the right to arbitrate. Noel F. Caraccio PLLC v. Thomas, 29 Misc.3d 1230 (A) (City Ct., Rye 2010); Rotker at 791.

Thus, it is questionable as to whether Scordio remains good law, and as such, it is prudent to notify the former client of his rights to arbitrate the fee in order to prevent a dismissal of an attorney’s action for payment.

— Elisa S. Rosenthal, Esq.

Associate

Law Office of Richard A. Klass

Copyr. 2014

Elisa S. Rosenthal, Esq. is an associate of the law firm of Richard A. Klass, Esq.. She practices primarily in the areas of commercial litigation, debt collection/enforcement of judgments, legal malpractice and real estate litigation. She may be reached by phone at (718) COURT-ST [(718) 268-7878)] or www.courtstreetlaw.com.

Contact our office if you have questions.

Sincerely yours,
Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Your Court Street Lawyer
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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-mail to richklass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

New York State Court of Appeals adopts "likely to succeed" standard in legal malpractice cases

The New York State Court of Appeals decided an issue of first impression in New York State concerning an issue that arises in legal malpractice cases. In Grace v. Law, [October 21, 2014], the Court had to decide whether a client's failure to pursue an appeal in the original, underlying lawsuit (which failed) bars him from pursuing a legal malpractice case against the attorney who lost the case.

In an opinion by Justice Sheila Abdus-Salaam, the Court of Appeals held that the proper standard for trial courts to consider in legal malpractice cases brought by losing clients against their original attorneys is whether the client would have been "likely to succeed" on appeal. Enunciating the proper standard, the decision stated that, "prior to commencing a legal malpractice action, a party who is likely to succeed on appeal of the underlying action should be required to press an appeal. However, if the client is not likely to succeed, he or she may bring a legal malpractice action without first pursuing an appeal of the underlying action.

In rejecting the defendant-attorney's argument that there should be an absolute bar to a legal malpractice case unless the client appealed the underlying court's decision, the decision noted that following the "likely to succeed" standard would not be unfair; this standard requires trial courts to speculate on the success of an appeal just as those courts engage in the same analysis when deciding other aspects of legal malpractice actions generally.


Contact me if you have questions.

Sincerely yours,
Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Your Court Street Lawyer
-----------
copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-mail to richklass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Judiciary Law Section 487 punishes attorneys who commit fraud upon the court, other parties or clients.

There is a special statute designed to punish attorneys who commit fraud upon the court, other parties or their clients, Judiciary Law Section 487. Section 487 states as follows:

Misconduct by attorneys. An attorney or counselor who:

1. Is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party; or,
2. Wilfully delays his client's suit with a view to his own gain; or, wilfully receives any money or allowance for or on account of any money which he has not laid out, or becomes answerable for,
Is guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor by the penal law, he forfeits to the party injured treble damages, to be recovered in a civil action.

Generally, New York courts have held that a cognizable claim under Judiciary Law §487 exists when there is a ‘chronic and extreme pattern of legal delinquency.’ Solow Management Corp. v. Seltzer, 18 AD3d 399 (1st Dept. 2005), citing to Jaroslawicz v. Cohen, 12 AD3d 160 (1st Dept. 2004); Cohen v. Law Offices of Leonard and Robert Shapiro, 18 AD3d 219 (1st Dept. 2005). Some courts have held “a single act or decision, if sufficiently egregious and accompanied by an intent to deceive, is sufficient to support liability [under Judiciary Law §487]. Trepel v. Dippold, 2005 WL 1107010 (SDNY 2005). In the cited Jaroslawicz action, the First Department held:

The cause of action for statutory treble damages under Judiciary Law §487 was properly dismissed because there is no pleading that defendants acted with ‘intent to deceive the court or any party,’ and no pleading of a pattern of delinquent, wrongful, or deceitful behavior by the attorney defendants, or of pecuniary damages resulting from the alleged wrong.

Coupled with the above pleading requirements, the plaintiff must plead that “the alleged deceit forming the basis of such a cause of action, if it is not directed at a court, must occur during the course of a ‘pending judicial proceeding.’” Costalas v. Amalfitano, 305 AD2d 202 (1st Dept. 2003), citing to Hansen v. Caffry, 280 AD2d 704, lv. denied, 97 NY2d 603.

In order to recover under Judiciary Law §487, a plaintiff must plead and prove both actual deceit by the attorney, Bernstein v. Oppenheim, 160 A.D.2d 428, (1st Dep't 1990), and causation, that is, that the deceit or collusion actually caused plaintiff's damages. See, e.g., Manna v. Ades, 237 A.D.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1997); DiPrima v. DiPrima, 111 A.D.2d 901 (2d Dept. 1985); Brown v. Samalin & Bock, P.C., 155 A.D.2d 407 (2d Dept. 1989).

Concerning the issue as to what constitutes “deceit” under Judiciary Law§487, the court in Amalfitano v. Rosenberg, 428 F.Supp.2d 196 (SDNY 2006), set forth the definition from Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004), as including: (1) The act of intentionally giving a false impression… (2) A false statement of fact made by a person knowingly or recklessly (i.e. not caring whether it is true or false) with the intent that someone else will act upon it… (3) A tort arising from a false representation made knowingly or recklessly with the intent that another person should detrimentally rely on it.

As to the issue of what constitutes damages under Judiciary Law §487, the court in Amalfitano v. Rosenberg, supra, determined that the parties’ costs in defending themselves in the litigation against an action which was founded upon deceit were damages under such section.

In a recent decision of the NYS Court of Appeals, Melcher v. Greenberg Traurig, LLP, 2014 NY Slip Op. 02213 [2014], the court had to determine whether the statute of limitations in actions brought under Judiciary Law Section 487 were governed by the 3-year statute of limitations period under CPLR 214(2) or the "catch-all" provision under CPLR 213(1), which provides a 6-year statute of limitations period in which to bring an action against an attorney for deceit or collusion. The Court held that claims brought against attorneys for deceit or collusion under Judiciary Law Section 487 are subject to the 6-year statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213(1).


Feel free to contact me if you have questions.

Sincerely yours,
Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Your Court Street Lawyer
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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-mail to richklass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Statute of Limitations for Legal Malpractice Action

CPLR 214(6) provides that “an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” must be commenced within 3 years.

The cause of action for malpractice accrues at the time of the act, error or omission. See, Julian v. Carrol, 270 AD2d 457 [2d Dept. 2000]; Goicoechea v. Law Offices of Stephen Kihl, 234 AD2d 507 [2d Dept. 1996]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164 [2001].

The Court of Appeals has held that a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues against the attorney when the statute of limitations expires on the underlying action for which the attorney was retained. See, Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. In Burgess v. Long Island Railroad Authority, 79 NY2d 777 [1991], the Court of Appeals held:

The Continuous Representation Toll of a Legal Malpractice Action

The accrual of the three-year statute of limitations is tolled during the period of the lawyer’s continuous representation in the same matter out of which the malpractice arose under the theory that the client should not be expected to question the lawyer’s advice while he is still representing the client. See, Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 AD2d 505 [2d Dept. 1990]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. Under the continuous representation doctrine, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the lawyer. See, Kanter v. Pieri, 11 AD3d 912 [4 Dept. 2004]; Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, supra; Clark v. Jacobsen, 202 AD2d 466 [2 Dept. 1994].

Contact me if you have questions.

Sincerely yours,
Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Your Court Street Lawyer
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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-mail to richklass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Klass in the News: Malpractice Rulings Extend NYC Lawyers' Ties To Old Clients

By Pete Brush

Law360
New York
September 11, 2014, 8:22 PM ET

New York City trial court and appellate rulings extending the clock on professional negligence claims against law firms that no longer directly represent those clients could boost malpractice risk and leave attorneys with tough choices over communicating on past matters, experts say....

...The current lay of the land in New York City, where the First Department holds sway, means lawyers must take careful approaches when considering how they might communicate with clients — especially unhappy clients — after the work at hand is done, according to Brooklyn-based attorney Richard A. Klass, who represents malpractice plaintiffs and defendants.

Transactional lawyers, for example, might want to foreclose advice on litigation or appeals at the outset, according to Klass, and they also may want to make it clear that no more advice will be forthcoming at the completion of an engagement in order to shield themselves.

"They should beef up both their hello letters and their goodbye letters," Klass said.

To read the entire article, click here.



Contact me if you have questions.

Sincerely yours,
Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Your Court Street Lawyer
-----------
copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-mail to richklass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Lawyer Misses the Bus (a $300,000 tale of woe)

The cabbie’s nightmare began with courtesy and continued with insult and injury.

It began as just another busy day in the life of a New York livery cab driver: picking up and dropping off passengers. On this particular day, the cabbie had pulled to the curb just past a bus stop in Manhattan to let out a passenger. He then stepped out of the car to open the passenger’s door. Perhaps he thought a little extra courtesy might result in a bigger tip but, no matter the reason, in this case, it cost him dearly.

The next moment, a New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) bus, while running its regular route, pulled behind the livery cab at the bus stop. The bus driver opened his door and shouted at the driver, “You idiot, what are you doing in the bus stop!” The cabbie calmly apologized and said he’d move his car. However, without waiting for that to happen, the bus driver drove the bus close to the cabbie, requiring him to close his passenger door slightly so as to avoid his car door being damaged by the bus. The bus driver then accelerated the bus and drove closer, striking the cabbie, and causing him severe personal injuries.

The injured driver hired a law firm to bring a personal injury claim. That law firm brought a case against the NYCTA, seemingly the owner and operator of the bus. Unfortunately, the law firm did not learn that the bus operator could only have been an employee of a separate public authority known as the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority (MABSTOA) until long past the statute of limitations period in which to make a claim. Only at the deposition of the bus depot dispatcher, held more than two years after the incident, did the law firm learn from the witness that the bus operators for that bus route were all MABSTOA employees and not NYCTA employees (and only because all bus operators listed on the “crew report” had the designation “M” for MABSTOA).

The case against the NYCTA went to trial and the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the NYCTA and dismissed the claims of the livery cab driver. The cab driver then retained Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer to make a claim against the personal injury law firm for legal malpractice.

Time-barred by the Statute of Limitations:

The concept of a “Statute of Limitations” is that people are afforded a certain amount of time to take action concerning a legal claim they may have; if that period of time passes without taking action, then the ability to pursue the legal claim has been waived. Most people are familiar, for instance, that in New York State the statute of limitations period within which to file most personal injury cases is three years from the date of accident. In this particular case, though, a notice of claim had to be served upon MABSTOA within 90 days of the incident under certain rules contained in the Public Authorities Law and General Municipal Law §50-e; then, an action had to be commenced in 1 year and 90 days after the incident.

Confusion between the MTA, NYCTA and MABSTOA:

Within the “alphabet soup” letters of all of these different municipal authorities lays a trap to catch the unwary. According to the statutory scheme laid out in the Public Authorities Law §1260 et. seq., the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) is a public benefit corporation which was created to oversee the mass transportation systems of New York City, and which functions as an umbrella organization for various other independent but affiliated agencies. See, In re New York Public Interest Research Group Straphangers Campaign, Inc., 309 AD2d 127 [1 Dept. 2003]. However, aside from the MTA’s overall organization, the MTA and each of its subsidiaries (which include NYCTA and MABSTOA) must be separately sued and are not responsible for each other’s torts. See, Mayayev v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority Bus, 74 AD3d 910 [2 Dept. 2010]. As provided for in Public Authorities Law §1203-a, MABSTOA is a subsidiary, public benefit corporation.

In Nowinski v. City of New York, 189 AD2d 674 [1 Dept. 1993], the plaintiff sued MABSTOA for personal injuries sustained at a location for which the NYCTA maintained responsibility. The plaintiff sought to serve a late notice of claim and both MASTOA and NYCTA moved to dismiss the action. The court held that the injured person was time-barred from serving the late notice of claim, given that the statute of limitations had already long expired. (See, generally, Public Authorities Law §1276).

No claim for being “lulled” into a false sense of security:

To the extent that the law firm could have claimed in its defense that it could not have known of the relationship between the MABSTOA, MTA, NYCTA and the relevant bus operators identified in the crew report, the court in Delacruz v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 45 AD3d 482 [1 Dept. 2007], held that the injured plaintiff could not claim that, by the actions of the MTA, he was “lulled into a false sense of security” that his lawyer sued the right public authority. The court specifically held the doctrine of “equitable estoppel” applies only when a governmental subdivision acts wrongfully or negligently inducing reliance by a party who is entitled to rely and who changes his position to his detriment or prejudice. There was no evidence here of any wrongful conduct by the NYCTA; it did not hide the information about MABSTOA or mislead the injured driver’s lawyer.

The legal malpractice claim was settled for $300,000 to pay for the livery cab driver’s injuries and medical lien. This case only emphasizes the point of how important it is for a lawyer to identify the proper legal entities to be sued on behalf of a client.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Art credits:
Image at top of page: El Gouna (Red Sea, Egypt): public transport bus, customized and highly decorated in genuine Pakistani style. Coach built by Chishti Engineering (Karachi) and decorated by S. Gulzar (Karachi). Author/photographer: Marc Ryckaert, 2009. This image is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license.